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The Legal and Social Implications
of Insolvent Cross-Border Real
Estate Developers: Reviewing the
U.S. and Canadian Commercial
Real Estate Markets
Edward T. Canuel*
ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the phenomena associated with
cyclical real estate markets, discussing the theoretical and
market influences which motivate developers during this cycle.
Fluctuating commercial real estate markets necessitate a focus
on market upswings and downswings, and considerationof the
roles and motivations of a wide array of actors, ranging from
industry analysts and developers to lenders.
Legal
considerations, particularly during real estate downturns, or
busts, include a variety of issues, particularlyif the commercial
real estate developers in question conducted business
internationally. This Article details the theoretical and
economic conditions found during real estate market cycles,
with special emphasis on cross-border real estate developers.
Relevant legal considerations faced by such developers
confronting insolvency are also considered. Finally, the Article
notes possible measures which may mitigate the many pitfalls
confronting the insolvent developer.

* The Author is a graduate of Boston College, Boston College
Law School, and
Osgoode Hall Law School, where he received his LLM in Business Law. Currently, Mr.
Canuel is a Ph.D candidate in Law at the University of Oslo. Formerly with the
international law firm of McDermott, Will & Emery, where his practice included
government affairs, all aspects of commercial real estate, corporate finance law, and
complex cross-border transactions, the Author is now a diplomat with the U.S. Foreign
Service.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Real estate development forms a crucial aspect of the closelylinked economies of Canada and the United States. 1 During the late
twentieth century, real estate markets suffered a variety of market
rises and crashes. For example, in the U.S. real estate market bust of
1990, a resulting financial drain gripped the United States: The

1.
The strategic commercial relationship between both nations is clearly
evidenced by a significant volume of trade. The traffic of cross-border imports and
exports amounts to over $1 billion per day. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION BULLETIN 04-03 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU OFFICIAL STATISTICS (Note:
unless specified otherwise, all referenced currencies are in U.S. dollars)); U.S. Customs
& Border Prot., U.S., Canada Partnerwith Trade Community to Coordinate Emergency
Response, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroomlnews
releases/archives/2006 news releases/082006/08182006.xml;
EMBASSY
OF CAN.,
UNITED STATES-CANADA: THE WORLD'S LARGEST TRADING RELATIONSHIP (2001),
available at http://geo.international.gc.ca/can-am/washington/trade and_ investment/
wltr2001-en.pdf.
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bankruptcy of thousands of savings and loan institutions carried a
debt of $600 billion, and the government-owned Resolution Trust
Corporation held 40,000 foreclosed properties. 2 The Canadian
markets during the most recent real estate bust were also in turmoil;
the drop in market value of the shares of the five largest Canadian
developers in the first quarter of 1991 amounted to $1,935 million
3
(CDN).
Business cycles in the real estate development market are
characterized by certain identifiable phases: stagnation, recovery,
credit-based expansion, speculative fever, and crash. 4 Each phase
elicits different behavioral responses from the business community,
as "booms" lead to crises and depressions. 5 During the market

2.
JIM C. WHITEHEAD, THE MIDAS SYNDROME: AN INVESTIGATION INTO
PROPERTY BOOMS AND BUSTS 1, 83 (1996). The savings and loan crisis erupted in the
early 1980s when lenders, taking advantage of governmental deregulation, financed
hundreds of questionable office projects. Mark McCain, Despite High Vacancy Rates,
Buildings Keep Going Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1989 at 17. "[I]n the 1982 downturn,
60% of U.S. homebuilders went out of business and over 2 million housing-related jobs
were lost." WHITEHEAD, supra, at 77.
The aftermath of the bust was stark: In 1989, the national vacancy rate of
commercial real estate space was 18.6%. McCain, supra. Cumulatively, the banks and
savings and loan institutions lost $75 billion on bad U.S. property loans between 1982
and 1989. WHITEHEAD, supra, at 84 (citing The Property Crumble, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3,
1990, at 19-20). "With the collapse of the real estate market in 1984 came a
corresponding increase in the number of savings and loan institutions that faced
financial difficulty or closure." Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11-Does One Size Fit All? 4 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167, 179 (1996) (citing STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES tbl. 795 (113th ed. 1993)). "In the years following the collapse, approximately
5,000 savings and loans were in financial difficulty and 500 more closed." Id. The
bursting of the speculative real estate bubble (and the availability of a ready device
with which to blunt the worst effects of the collapse) led to the massive surge of
thousands of single asset real estate filings. Id. (citing Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real
Estate Cases and the Good Faith Requirement: Why Reluctance to Ask Whether a Case
Belongs in Bankruptcy May Lead to the Incorrect Result, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 77, 77 n.1
(1992)). Subsequent Code amendments in 1994 attempted to protect real estate
lenders and constrain the number of single asset filings. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 218, 108 Stat. 4128.
3.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 83. Real estate developers faced enormous
losses prior to the commercial real estate crash of the early 1990s in other market
downturns. For example, Canadian developers "Carma, Daon and NuWest continued
to show losses in 1982-1983 of the order of $1 billion dollars (CDN)." Id. at 111.
Carma's internal attempts to retool its operations and markets, including its
acquisition of the Allarco company, have been analyzed by commentators. See id. at
117.
4.
Id. at 24.
5.
Id. at 37. A depression is "a normal process of reabsorption and liquidation
characterized by outbreaks of crisis-panic, breakdown of the credit system, an
epidemic of bankruptcies and its further consequences-and the abnormal process of
liquidation." Id. (quoting J.A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(1959)). A financial depression has also been defined as "a severe and prolonged
recession characterized by inefficient economic productivity, high unemployment, and
falling price levels." TheFreeDictionary: Depression, http://financial-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/Depression (last visited April 21, 2007). Liquidation is defined
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downslide, credit becomes scarce as banks and entrepreneurs seek
6
liquidity, although very few borrowers exist to replace the lost loans.
The developers' responses have direct effects on the real estate
7
markets, particularly evident in periods of dramatic over-building.
Real estate development has been characterized as a series of stages,
building upon initial real estate market recovery and ending with a
crash, leading to economic stagnation.8
Recently, the tide of real estate market investment has again
surged.
Large-scale developers in major North American
metropolitan centers such as Miami9 have developed substantial real
estate projects. Lenders, once hesitant to finance mid-size or smallmarket real estate ventures, have become aggressive; 10 financiers are

as "[any transaction that offsets or closes out a long or short position."
TheFreeDictionary:
Liquidation,
http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com
liquidation (last visited Apr. 21, 2007). Liquidation is viewed as creating "a spiral
contraction of prices, credit and demand," which "penetrates the entire economic
system." WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 37 (quoting SCHUMPETER, supra).
6.
WHITEHEAD, supranote 2, at 37.
7.
"In times of economic turbulence, as occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, the
amplitude of the business cycle dramatically increases, the period shortens, and uncertainty
grows." Id. at 36. Following the high technology crash in 2001, office space need decreased,
with "32.1 million sq. ft. of negative absorption recorded in the top [fifty] metropolitan
markets .... " Ben Johnson, Ouch! Double-digit Vacancies Hit Office Market, NAT'L REAL
EST. INVESTOR, Sept. 1, 2001, available at http://nreionline.coml magtreal-estateouch_
doubledigit vacancies/index.html. Additionally, the "national office vacancy rate . . .
reached 10%, the highest level since year-end 1997." Id.
8.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 36. Theorists propose that distressed
companies ultimately have three options: (i) refinance (raising additional funds,
perhaps involving an overhaul of the debt side of the balance sheet, or the company
finding funds from a term lender, a venture capitalist, or a provincial or federal
agency); (ii) reorganization ("in the form of a merger or an acquisition by a compatible
company [that] can provide the technical, operational, and financial support that a
distressed company needs to achieve its full potential, a process which could be lengthy
and complex"); and (iii) restructuring. Bernard R. Wilson, The Creditors' and Debtors'
Guide to Survival and Success, 28 CBR-ART 25, 63-65 (1995).
9.
Following the downward track of high technology stocks, investors shifted
their money to real estate, with developers planning several residential tower
condominiums. Kirk Nielsen, It's a Mad Mad Mad Loft World, MIAMI NEW TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2003, available at http://www.miaminewtimes.com /2003-09-04/news/it.s-amad-mad-mad-loft-world. In 2003, "40 new high-rise condominium and rental
apartment projects, mostly luxury, were under construction or planned in downtown
Miami." Id. By the year 2010, Miami-Dade county anticipates that the number of
downtown residents will increase by 9,347 to 106,650, requiring an additional 4,700
units over existing capacity. Id. Accordingly, "when the high-rise residential projects
currently planned or under construction are completed in 2006 there will be an
expected surplus of about 15,000 units." Id. If Miami-Dade "county's conservative
census-based projections remain valid," this surplus will address the number "needed
by the year 2020, when the downtown population reaches 136,000." Id.
10.
Mid-sized banks, such as Corus Bankshares in Chicago (with eleven local
branches), have successfully concentrated on construction and mortgage lending. Kirk
Shinkle, Small Bank Has Big Reputation as Commercial Lender, INVESTOR's Bus.
DAILY, INC., Sept. 23, 2004, at A07. The projects are riskier and larger in size than
that traditionally handled by community banks, with "[riecent deals includ[ing] a $57
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again looking at the leverage ratios of certain clients with guarded
optimism." As the development market cautiously grows, concerns
are raised as to what will occur when (or if) the market drops. The
current expansionist market has once again triggered theorists to
analyze real estate market trends. Theorists contend that the boom
of a business cycle predicts an increased volume of real estate
inventory hitting the market in a relatively short timeframe. 12
Alternatively, the market bust signals that there are no longer any
purchasers, and business cycles end with over-supply, business
13
failures, and financial crises.
Part II of this Article explores the cyclical commercial real estate
industry, addressing the causes of real estate development market
swings. Issues analyzed include: (i) the interrelationship between
developers and lenders and the general concept of real estate cycles;
(ii) the insolvency of well-known Canadian developers, most notably
Olympia & York and its vast cross-border holdings; and (iii) the
idiosyncrasies of real estate developers, with a focus on the personal
attributes that precipitated their businesses' demise. Part III reviews
legal issues faced during the cross-border insolvencies of developers,
including: (i) substantive consolidation; (ii) debtor-in-possession (DIP)
financing; (iii) the extension of the stay of proceedings, particularly
when a landlord "goes dark"; (iv) executory contracts; and (v) cramdown provisions. The Article concludes by noting what safeguards
can be instituted to either slow the economic slide of a developer or
cushion its fall into insolvency.

million loan to build condos in Fort Myers [Florida], and an $81 million loan for a
Washington, D.C., office building." Id. "Corus specializes almost exclusively in big
projects," lending close to its legal limit. Id. 'Thefirm's 76 largest loans, between $20
million and $75 million, make up more than 80% of its commitments," with its current
loan pipeline at $4 billion. Id. Corus' strength has been loft/condo conversions which
make up 61% of its portfolio. Id.
Although mortgage rates may increase with
continuing upswings in interest rates, Corus has a substantial cash position: The size
and strength of Corus' capital allows it to take possession of, and maintain, nonperforming properties, until market conditions improve. Id.; see also Matt Maile,
Means Forsees Continued Growth, J. REC., Jan. 17, 2003, at 1 (stating that "[n]et
valuations of property in Oklahoma county have risen from $2.178 billion in 1992 to
$3.558 billion in 2002," with real estate valuations growing over $1 billion).
11.
"Leverage" is defined as "a high ratio of debt to equity, which exposes a
company to even small changes in the property market. In a financially leveraged
company the effects of small market changes are amplified." WHITEHEAD, supra note
2, at 9.
12.
13.

Id. at 20.
Id.
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II. ANALYZING REAL ESTATE MARKETS, THE DOWNFALL OF
DEVELOPERS, AND THE "TYPICAL" REAL ESTATE ENTREPRENEUR

Jim Whitehead's comprehensive analysis of the cyclical
commercial real estate market, The Midas System, remains the most
authoritative scholarship contending with the social, legal, and
economic implications of international commercial real estate
downturns and upswings. Accordingly, the Author acknowledges the
sizeable contribution which Whitehead's important study has made to
this piece.
A. Real Estate Markets: Noting Upswings and Downturns
Theorists have widely analyzed the concept of booms and busts
in the commercial real estate market, proposing that the property
development industry has suffered three recent and distinctive boom
periods: 1973-1974, 1978-1981, and 1987-1989. 14 During these
periods, Canadian developers with extensive cross-border holdings,
such as Bramlea, Campeau, Carma Developers, Olympia & York, and
Trizec, all became insolvent (their liabilities exceeded assets). 15 In
the 1991 real estate development collapse, the office markets in many
North American cities were overbuilt. 16 While favorable interest
rates encouraged real estate investors, one expert argues that
developers followed a "natural tendency" to "get carried away" until
the real estate cycle ended. 17 In addition, developers, financiers, and
government officials blamed each other on a variety of issues,
including interest rate increases (arguably decreasing capital flows to
projects), 18 overly optimistic developer forecasts, and blaming
generous funding. 19 Other theorists, specifically pointing to the U.S.

14.
Id. at 11.
15.
Id. The most well-known U.S. real estate developer, Donald Trump, had
his empire crumble in the 1980s. See id. at 45-47; see also Allen R. Myerson, More
Than a Chip Off the Building Block, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at C1 (discussing U.S.
developer Trammel Crow's decline in the 1980s).
16.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 13.
17.
See Nielsen, supra note 9; see also Tracy Barbour, Alaska's Urban Real
Estate Markets: Housing Market Brisk, Commercial Market Brings in New Names,
ALASKA Bus. MONTHLY, June 1, 2006, available at http://www.allbusiness.comlnorthamerica/united-states-alaska/1180387-1.html
(stating that the robust Alaskan
commercial real estate market may face obstacles if interest rates increase).
18.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 13. It has been suggested that "higher
interest rates will not only discourage future development, but ... could also pressure
rents before the economic expansion, which is uncertain at best, can absorb them." Gil
Sandler, The'Bubble Effect" on Real Estate Values: A Commentary, REAL EST. FIN.,
Aug. 1, 2005, at 3 (discussing how to create a more gentle real estate bubble
meltdown).
19.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 14. During boom cycles, governments, in
particular, often contradict themselves; on one hand, governments continue to follow
unalterable review controls, while a government's promotional arm encourages real
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savings and loan crash in the 1980s, take note of financial
institutions investing in development projects that promised high
return rates (while these institutions took full advantage of then20
existing tax subsidies).
Although historically the initial stimulus of a boom real estate
economy varies dramatically (e.g., oil price increases and gluts of
petrodollars seeking investments and the deregulation of the
financial industry), extremely favorable economic conditions
generally precede each property boom. 21 Whitehead aptly noted the
hidden dangers that are ignored or unnoticed during a boom:
First, the shortfall between the supply and the demand is not es large
as first perceived. Profit-making opportunities are created for those
developers who deliver their products to the market early in the cycle.
Second, the magnitude of the property boom is not directly related to
the level of economic activity. Rather, the size of the property boom
and its intensity seem to be related to the availability of credit, the
developer's perceptions of growth potential, and the ability to gauge the
actions of competitors.
. . . The weak correlation between the actual demand for new
construction, the builders' perceptions of new housing opportunities,
and new construction itself gives rise to decision errors leading either to
over-building or under-building. 22

In an economy moving towards the apex of a boom, several
themes emerge: (i) developers become reckless and aggressive, given
previous successes; (ii) a developer's business associates and bankers
often follow the developer blindly and abandon independent thought;
(iii) incorrect development forecasts lead developers astray; and (iv)
the boldest real property purchases are often made at the market
bottom's peak. 23 "The debt accumulated during the boom years

estate developers by providing positive growth forecasts and offering a "financing
infrastructure." Id. at 36.
20.
See Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-time vs. Periodic An Economic
Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAx. L. REV. 305, 339-40, 344 (1994).
21.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 24. "The coming together of energizing forces
in the real estate market, the buoyant financial climate, and the development
industry's positioning fuels a surge of activity in property development." Id. at 24-25.
22.
Id. at 40 (citing R.U. RADCLIFFE, REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS (1961), W. SMITH,
URBAN DEVELOPMENT: THE PROCESS AND THE PROBLEMS (1975), and W.G. GRIGSBY,
HOUSING MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1967)).
23.
Id. at 45. When reviewing the fluctuation of prices during cycles, certain
theorists assert that real property prices are intrinsically inefficient as compared to
most traded assets (such as foreign exchange, equities, or bonds), creating immense,
basic valuation issues. Hot Property, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1999, at 86. Specifically, real
property, unlike stock shares in a highly liquid market, is an illiquid asset in a market
where buying and selling is occasional, resulting in fewer opportunities for prices to
reflect real estate product information. Id.; see also Thomas A. Motta et al., The Future
of the Valuation Profession:Diagnostic Tools and PrescriptivePractices for Real Estate
Markets, APPRAISAL J., Oct. 1, 2003, at 345 (discussing various diverse methods of real
estate valuation).
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reflects both the inflation of real estate values and the leveraging of
those values by debt. ' 24 Under booms, the first developers enter
markets characterized by a great unsatisfied demand, and they often
make windfall profits; gains encourage increased development, which
25
saturates the market and forces expansion into other markets.
Some developers are successful, and the frenzy of buying and selling
in hot real estate markets inflates land prices, as developers actually
create their own boom. 26 Land Banking, the purchasing and
maintaining of real estate inventory, overtakes land development as
real property values surpass the costs of keeping inventory. 27 As
such, developers commit to massive borrowing, using land as
collateral to purchase additional land. 28 "Some of the larger jointstock companies raising capital use the inflationary increase in land
value as a measure of their real equity ...[which] permits the raising
of additional capital through corporate debentures and share
offerings to purchase even more land. ' 29 In such a situation, some
companies become so financially leveraged that they are vulnerable to
interest rate fluctuations and to slight changes in supply and demand
of real estate. 30
As a market boom progresses, developers often
become reckless; when the real property market drops, developers
whose strategies are predicated on continuing inflation, everincreasing market share, and financial leverage often fail. 31 The
decisionmaking process during expansionist real estate cycles often
creates hasty, poorly executed decisions which affect the urban

WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 48-49.
25.
Id. at 15.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. In land banking, property values were artificially raised (for example,
in Calgary, potentially developable urban land values were inflated "up to sixty times"
that of agricultural land near the city's limits, and up to five times the values of
agricultural property several miles outside the city). Id. at 127-28. Calgary would
have had to grow by 4 million in the 1980s to absorb all the land on which the
developers and others were speculating. Id. at 128. Developers predicted that interest
rates would inflate less than land values. Id. Land banking essentially allowed
developers to use unlimited debt to purchase land, which, in times of needed liquidity,
could be sold. Id.
28.
Id. at 15.
29.
Id. at 15-16.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. Investors who overestimated the present value of what a specific
property could accumulate in rent over its lifetime, deducting costs, incorrectly believed
that constructing new real estate projects would result in profits. Hot Property, supra
note 23, at 86. Richard Herring and Susan Wachter of the Wharton School conducted a
study of property price cycles in the United States, Sweden, Thailand, and Japan, and
found that real estate bubbles in these countries tended to share common causes. Id.
They found that as it took months (or years) to complete the buildings, a substantial
amount of time passed before the developers, and those banks who had lent to them,
discovered their mistake. Id. Lenders realized their errors only after enormous
amounts of "money had been wasted, a large number of unprofitable new buildings had
reached the market-and the market bubble had burst." Id.
24.
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growth process in significant ways, 32 such as the creation of
inefficiencies by ignoring vacant land, while the end product
33
sacrifices quality of design, materials, and workmanship.
Real estate market busts follow the development upswings, as
the following industrial collapse adversely impacts the regional
economy. 34 "Given the magnitude of the callable loans, interest
payments, and outstanding principal repayments, even the strongest
companies take drastic action. '35 One aftershock of a real estate bust
is a marked increase in local unemployment rates and lost jobs. 3 6 At
the close of the boom in 1982, as most real estate developers faced
insolvency and many confronted bankruptcy, the collapse of the
development companies helped precipitate the bankruptcy of
contractors, subcontractors, and investors, also triggering mergers
among financial institutions. 37 Theorists contend that several
reasons for a bust exist, including: (i) over-supply (which can only be
cured by an upturn in the economy) and (ii) debtor firms persuading
banks to enter into long-term loan modification and debt
restructuring before the market improves, giving the developers a
38
chance to ride up the next cycle without the threat of bankruptcy.
B. Cross-BorderReal Estate Developers
The experiences of Canadian developers in the 1980s illustrate
the plight of developers through booms and busts. As they began to
compete for contracts to develop real estate in the United States,

32.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 17.
33.
In the 1980s race to build during a boom (as particularly evidenced in
Calgary), incompatible office uses in urban planning, typified by a lack of aesthetic
coherence, was the norm. Id. at 97. Accordingly, in the middle of the 1980s boom,
Calgary lost its zoning bylaw. Id. Questions of environmental quality arose, in
addition to the unfinished look of partially developed, premature subdivisions, which
have been described as the "physical manifestations of hasty and ill-conceived
decisions."
Id. at 100; see also Edward T. Canuel, Supporting Smart Growth
Legislation and Audits: An Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Land Planning Theories
and Tools, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 309, 310-11 (discussing the negative connotations of
"sprawl").
An additional example of a developer land banking and ignoring
development potential, much to a municipality's chagrin, may be found in Boston.
That city, acting with support from the Boston Redevelopment Authority, has now
threatened to pull certain permits of a major real estate developer, Frank McCourt.
Thomas C. Palmer, City Presses McCourt to Develop South Boston Site, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 11, 2006, at D.4. The city is angered by McCourt's pace in developing twenty-four
acres of South Boston land. Id.
34.

WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 25.

35.
Id. at 76.
36.
In Calgary, the local economy spiraled downward: The unemployment rate
went from 5.7% (1982) to 15% (1983); 44,000 jobs were lost in the period. Id. at 87.
37.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 107.
38.
Id. at 77. Many firms, technically bankrupt, must rest their very survival
upon the decisions of their creditors. Id.
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Canadian developers (with financial backing from the so-called "Big
Five" institutional lenders of the 1980s) out-maneuvered local rivals
who were obliged to cobble together their financing for each project
from a variety of lenders in the then-fragmented U.S. banking
industry.3 9 Charles and Edgar Bronfman's 40 Cadillac Fairview Corp.
Ltd., developer of the Toronto-Dominion Centre and the Eaton
Centre, and Richard Schiffs Bramalea Ltd., whose namesake
residential subdivision west of Toronto laid the foundation for a
North American empire of commercial, retail, and hotel projects, were
41
among those leading Canadian developers.
In the late 1980s, all of the major Canadian banks had written
down their real estate loans by hundreds of millions of dollars, with
many of western Canada's banks wiped out by non-performing real
estate loans. 42 Oil capitals (such as Calgary and Edmonton) fared
poorly after the collapse of oil prices after 1980. 4 3 In 1982, the office
market crash hit Calgary, with tenants leasing 3,970,000 square feet
less than the previous year, resulting in a six million square-foot
surplus of unoccupied, newly constructed office space. 44 Banks faced
enormous write-offs, as they suffered the consequences of being overly
generous in lending to real estate development companies during the
boom. 45 For example, the Chemical Banking Corporation had 15% of
its total loans in commercial real estate, Citibank had 14%, and the
Toronto Dominion Bank had 3% (with non-performing loans in its
U.S. portfolio amounting to $230 million). 46 The bust following the
1978-1981 real estate boom resulted in the bankruptcy of Canadian
Commercial Bank of Edmonton, while weaker Canadian banks
merged with stronger ones (e.g., Mercantile Bank merged with
47
National Bank).
The most telling example of a cross-border real estate developer's
decline is illustrated in the saga of Olympia & York Developments

39.
David Olive, Growing Up; Toronto Flexes Its Muscle in the Business World,
Powered by a New Generation Willing to Take Risks, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 10, 2002, at
FOL.
40.
The Bronfmans gained control of an old conglomerate known as Brascan,
and then proceeded to acquire several companies in the 1980s, including "real-estate
developers Bramalea and Trizec Corp. Ltd. (owner of Yorkdale Shopping Centre and
Montreal's landmark Place Ville Marie)." Id.
41.
Id. These Toronto-based firms, financed by Toronto banks, created major
development projects in several U.S. cities, including Boston and Houston. The real
estate bust precipitated the bankruptcies of several major real estate developers,
including Bramalea and Cadillac Fairview. Id.
42.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 20. Several Canadian trust companies (e.g.,
Royal trust, Central Guaranty Trust, and Financial Trustco) and insurance companies
(e.g., Sovereign Life) were wound down by receivers or merged. Id. at 21.
43.
Id. at 80.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 78.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 82.
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Ltd. (OYD), the parent of a family of companies (collectively, O&Y),
operating primarily in the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom. 48 OYD held the marquee office towers throughout Canada
(e.g., First Canadian Place and Scotia Plaza in Toronto) 49 and a vast
series of U.S. holdings, as evidenced by once being the largest
commercial landlord in New York).5 0 O&Y's troubles stemmed from:
(i) over-expansion during inflationary years, (ii) the money-draining
$6 billion development of London's Canary Wharf, 61 (iii) bankrupt
tenants, 52 and (iv) the decision from certain lenders to reduce
desperately needed financing by $150 million (requiring a security
interest on O&Y's remaining unencumbered Canadian real estate
interests, effectively prohibiting future financings). 53 At its apex, the
company held $20 billion in real estate assets and, at its low point in
54
1993, owed $6.7 billion on its Canadian office towers alone.
The complex, multi-tiered corporate structure of O&Y created
numerous court proceedings, 55 while centralizing the assets (and loan
draw-downs) of the revenues and loans for all of the O&Y companies
to meet the obligations of all the companies (with the exception of its
U.S. real estate assets held by a U.S. subsidiary). 56 At the time of its
1992 filing, the O&Y bankruptcy applicants incurred $13.5 (CDN)
billion in debt.5 7 The debtor sought (and obtained) the benefit of
Chapter 11's automatic stay of proceedings by filing concurrently in
Canada and the United States. 58 OYD owned approximately 80% of

48.
See generally Edward T. Canuel, U.S. - Canadian Insolvencies: Reviewing
Conflicting Legal Mechanisms, Challenges and Opportunities for Cross-Border
Cooperation, 4 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 8 (2005).
49.
First Canadian Place Scotia Plaza and the Exchange Tower alone contained
5.3 million square feet of rentable space and had combined debts of $1.3 billion. See id.
at 18 n.77 (citing Clyde H. Farnsworth, Olympia May Yield Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1992, at D1).
50.
Kenneth N. Gilpin, Developer and CreditorBid for Olympia & York U.S.A.,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1995, at D2.
51.
Clyde H. Farnsworth, Olympia & York Liquidation Plan Advances, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1993, at D6.
52.
Mervyn Rothstein, Commercial Real Estate; Dividing an Office Tower to
Get the Most From It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999, at B8.
53.
See Canuel, supra note 48, at 19 (citing Yoine Goldstein et al., Olympia &
York: Navigating Uncharted Waters, in CASE STUDIES IN RECENT CANADIAN
INSOLVENCY REORGANIZATIONS 150, 151 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1997)).
54.
Farnsworth, supra note 51, at D6.
55.
Canuel, supra note 48, at 19.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Note that the parties did not attempt to seek recognition of the Canadian
proceedings under § 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, under which, as will be
discussed subsequently, a "foreign representative" may commence ancillary
proceedings; that provision requires appointment of a monitor (which the Canadian
applicants did not intend) and the existence of a trustee (which does not exist under a
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) filing). Id. at 20 n.91 (citing Goldstein,
supra note 53, at 156).
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the five U.S. insolvency applicants, which were all indirect owners of
the U.S. assets. 59 The issued stay placed the Canadian parent out of
the U.S. creditors' collective grasp, while also protecting the U.S.
restructuring process from being immediately controlled by the
Canadian creditors. 60
Another significant
Canadian real estate development
enterprise, the Campeau Corporation, restructured its assets in the
1980s following huge losses suffered by its U.S. subsidiaries-the
Federated Department Stores, Inc. and Allied Store Corporation. 61
Robert Campeau was a former Ottawa house builder whose Harbour
Castle Hotel, along with O&Y's Toronto Star building, pioneered
large-scale development on Toronto's waterfront in the 1970s. 62
Robert Campeau acquired Allied Stores Corporation for $3.5 billion in
1986 and Federated Department Stores for $6.6 billion in 1988.63 At
one point, Campeau's debt exceeded $10 billion. 64 During the 1990
insolvency proceedings, Campeau's successor in interest, Camdev,
only succeeded its financially troubled parent after extensive,
lengthy, and costly restructuring proceedings. 65 Campeau had
neither the interest nor experience in running the department
stores. 66 Despite his vision that the purchase of the stores would
facilitate a planned shopping center expansion in the United States,
he soon realized that the cash flow from operations and asset sales
would not cover repayment of acquisition loans. 67 He lost his
personal fortune (estimated at near $500 million) and control of the
company to the Reichmanns (who lost $136 million of their $560
68
million investment in Campeau Corporation).

59.
60.
61.

Canuel, supra note 48, at 19.
Id. (citing Goldstein, supra note 53, at 155).
Kevin McElcheran, The Restructuring of Campeau Corporation,in CASE

STUDIES IN RECENT CANADIAN INSOLVENCY REORGANIZATIONS, supra note 53, at 75-76;

see also Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd., [1992] 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303
(Can.).
62.
Olive, supra note 39.
63.

WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 44.

64.
Turn In

See McElcheran, supra note 61, at 75-76; see also Carol B. Swanson, The
Takeovers: A Study in Public Appeasement and Unstoppable Capitalism, 30

GA. L. REV. 943, 982 n.164 (1996); Steven N. Kaplan, Federated's Acquisition and
Bankruptcy: Lessons and Implications, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1103, 1105-06 (1994)
(discussing valuation of buy-outs under bankruptcy regimes, with emphasis upon
Campeau).

65.

See McElcheran, supra note 61.

66.

WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 44.

67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 45. Another case of an insolvent developer that would have benefited
from the innovations of the O&Y cases was Northland Properties, a major western
Canadian developer heavily involved in large-scale development projects, primarily in
the U.S. and Canadian Pacific Northwest. At the height of its success, Northland
employed over 1,000 employees and subsequently became indebted to over 2,100
creditors. In 1988, Northland claimed insolvency, following a period of interest rates
exceeding 20% and negative equity approaching $100 million (CDN). Ralph D. McRae,
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Development failures, particularly in Canada, were often a
"result of an unmanageable growth rate, land banking, and a
fascination with appraisal surplus, as well as a singular reliance on
one-time sales and an uncritical view of success. ' 69 With respect to
unmanageable growth rates, developers quickly accumulated assets,
where high growth rates became difficult to manage. 70 Near the peak
of the boom, developers: (i) overpaid for new properties and tendered
contracts that locked costs at unmanageably high levels (and,
thereafter, land and construction prices tumbled); (ii) bought
overpriced lots in inadequate locations; and (iii) became embroiled in
class-action law suits with condominium buyers related to the poor
71
construction of large-scale residential real estate projects.
C. Real Estate Entrepreneurs:IdiosyncraticFactors
Several factors of the individual developers contributed to
investment mistakes, including their perceptions of the business
environment. 72 Under the so-called 'Midas Syndrome" shared by
developers, real estate development industry leaders (generally at the
forefront of innovation, discovery, and action) become overly confident
and aggressive during property booms; accordingly, their followers
display "groupthink," a herd instinct spreading and amplifying the
original strategic errors made by their leading developers.7 3 During

Northland Properties, in
CASE STUDIES
REORGANIZATIONS, supra note 53, at 101.
69.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 123.

IN

RECENT

CANADIAN

INSOLVENCY

70.
Id. at 124.
71.
Id. at 127. Assets purchased at the beginning of a boom are of a good value,
but assets purchased near the peak of a business cycle typically are overpriced and too
large for the market to digest, given the approaching glut. Id. at 136. A number of
factors account for the change in results, including overworked markets, companies
dumping unwanted assets, acquisitions made on "the greater fool theory" (if the
acquisition does not turn out right, there is always someone else willing to buy it), and
larger projects becoming unstable, posing a threat to the developer's survival. Id.
Carma Development suffered several development project nightmares in western
Canada, particularly due to planning goals (and expectations), which fell short of
projections. Canuel, supra note 33, at 336 n.163. For example, Calgary's McKenzie
Towne project, which incorporated high-density growth principles and public transit
into its mixed use community, faced several difficulties, including high vacancy rates,
stagnant sales, and the failure for the light rail system to be included. Id. The
developer ultimately abandoned several of its development goals. Id.
72.

WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 15.

73.
Id. Strong, charismatic leaders often precipitate groupthink. Id. at 175.
The group herd mentality and enticement of gains caused concern. As one developer
noted, the allure of high profits caused people (particularly forthcoming retirees) to
abandon their conservative investment policies, lose their entire investment portfolio
in three or four years, and then be forced into working during their retirement years.
Id. at 178-79. Managers without knowledge of the property development business
were hired. Id. at 182. "Finance departments considered themselves to be profit
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these booms, "developers make repeated strategic decision errors
related to growth, diversification, and financing. '74 The dynamism of
the developer essentially dominates the development enterprise.
Whitehead proposes that the more talented (and cunning)
entrepreneurs move on early in the business cycle; inferior leadership
remains in the market, leading to lower quality products or services
produced at higher costs, thereby contributing to a further lowering of
profit margins. 75 Real estate entrepreneurs possess qualities such as
rationality (collecting data about products,
markets,
and
competitors), a sense of preparing for market strategy, and high
public profile and stature (often using the media). 76 For example,
Australian developer Alan Bond was characterized by an unmatched
audacity, an inordinate fondness for other people's money, and a
willingness "to bend the rules until out of shape. '77 In addition, he
placated enraged creditors by sprinkling small payments among them
(promising more later, daring them to make him go bust); he staved
off the judgment of the market by dodging taxes and making friends
78
with politicians.

centers and took on lives of their own, independent of their original function." Id. at
184.
74.
Id. at 15.
75.
Id. at 42. The nature of the decision environment predicated on a
centralized, strong-willed developer surrounded by placating employees leads to
disastrous results. The ill-effects of a domineering developer (and the resulting work
environment) include: (i) overconfident and inflated views of the relevant local
economy; (ii) believing economic successes are attributed to the developer, rather than
business conditions; (iii) failing to innovate and deviate from existing, previously
successful business strategies, while ignoring different new challenges; (iv) failure to
understand fully the local business climate; (v) misinterpreting or overvaluing business
forecasts; and (vi) hoping that previous successes will somehow overcome present or
future obstacles. Id. at 189-90.
76.
Id. at 42.
77.
Id. at 43-44.
78.
Id. at 44. The recently deceased U.S. developer/contractor Lelio "Les"
Marino epitomizes the rags to riches story and personal dynamism personifying certain
developers and contractors. See Stephanie Ebbert, Construction Firm Founder Dies;
Company Worked on the Big Dig; Company Faced Ban in Stalled Rte. 3 Work, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2004, at B1. Marino built a $1.3 billion empire consisting of a
conglomerate of construction, real estate, restaurant, and farm interests, arriving in
the United States as an Italian immigrant with only $30. Id. "In 1967, he launched
Modern Continental with a single $4,000 sidewalk repair contract." Id. Modern
Continental grew into a billion-dollar enterprise, with 4,000 employees, offices in New
York and California, and international and national projects. Lane Lambert, Lelio
Marino, Downfall of One Man's Legacy; Tragedy Reflects the Faded Glory of Modern
Continental, PATRIOT LEDGER, July 12, 2006, at 6. Evidencing his personal dynamism
(and eccentricities), he woke up between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. each day, worked out two
hours daily, never took vacations or days off from work, and dedicated himself to a
strict dietary regimen. Ebbert, supra. He was attributed as stating, "I want to see if
we can become the biggest company in the world .... The only person that can stop it
is me." Id. "Observers said it was Mr. Marino's ambition that caused his business to
suffer, as he spread himself thinner and his enterprise became unwieldy." Id. For
example, Modern Continental reportedly lost millions in 2002 on a waterfront real
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III. CROSS-BORDER REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND INSOLVENCIES:
LEGAL CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES

Cross-border real estate developer insolvencies 79 involve the
laws of all countries involved, which often vary dramatically in the
protections afforded. 80 The statutory frameworks of the Canadian and
U.S. legal regimes provide a perfect example. With respect to real
estate developer insolvencies, the relevant Canadian statutes are the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act (CCAA). 81 Alternatively, Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code must be reviewed when considering U.S.

estate deal. Lambert, supra. In 2004, "the Massachusetts Highway Department was
levying daily fines for the firm's delays in Route 3 roadwork north of Boston." Id.
Recent controversies include Modern Continental's work on the multi-billion dollar
Massachusetts Central Artery Tunnel Project, following the well-publicized discovery
of several hundred leaks in the tunnel. Ebbert, supra.
79.
The insolvency of real estate developers arguably draws upon issues and
obstacles recently confronted by telecommunications companies. The Author's personal
experiences as a practitioner attest to this. Similar to the dissolution of real estate
developers of the 1980s and 1990s, telecom companies often involve the disposition of a
substantive real estate portfolio (including sites for antenna communications, site
towers, and communication "hotels") and, like the developers of the 1980s, many
received generous financing from lenders hoping to cash in on the high tech wave. As
profits decreased and debts mounted, real estate portfolios became a target to capture
needed cash. For example, the telecommunications giant "Deutsche Telekom ... cut
the value of its real estate portfolio, . . . raising the likelihood that it would miss its
debt-reduction target." Bertrand Benoit, Companies & Finance Europe: D Telekom
Cuts Value of Real Estate Portfolio,FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at 26.
80.
General scholarship specifically concerning real estate matters under U.S.
insolvency law is admittedly sparse. Many commentators concentrate on fraudulent
conveyances and minimum benchmarks for foreclosure sales. See, e.g., Cynthia L.
DeReamer, Upsetting the Law of Transfer: Mortgage Foreclosures as Fraudulent
Conveyances Under the Bankruptcy Code, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 321 (1989) (citing Durrett
v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980), which established a 70%
benchmark by which to avoid a mortgage foreclosure as a fraudulent conveyance under
the Code). But see Ruebeck v. Attleboro Sav. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 BR. 163
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (discussing the reasonably prudent person standard in the
conduct of a sale); Adwar v. Cargo Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 B.R. 111 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the foreclosure market itself, and not the 70% "rule,"
should determine the standard for reasonably equivalent value). There is significant
scholarship concentrating on title matters created by insolvencies filed under the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). See Dwight Shipley, Real Property Titles as
Affected by Proceedings Under the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 14 CBR-ART 105 (1971)
(Carswell) (describing title matters with respect to real estate bankruptcy filings); see
also John S. Kelly, Tracing of Property Co-Mingled or Converted by Fiduciaries- A
Discussion of the Principlesand Rules Relating Thereto or How to Get It Back When It
Seems to Be Gone, 46 CBR-ART 189 (1983) (Carswell) (stating that under the
Bankruptcy Act, the "trustee of the bankrupt is only entitled to take the property of the
bankrupt subject to the rights and equities which affect the bankrupt").
81.
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) (R.S.C., ch. B-3 (1985), amended by
R.S.C., ch. 27, § 2 (1992), further amended by R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 269 (2004)) (Can.)
(hereinafter BIA); Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) (R.S.C. ch. C-36
(1985), amended by, ch. C-36, § 18.6 (2004)) (Can.).
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insolvencies. 82 Legal concepts applicable under both U.S. and
Canadian insolvency law include: substantive consolidation, debtorin-possession financing, extension of the stay of proceedings,
executory contracts, and cram-down provisions. However, these
concepts have often markedly different implications under the U.S.
and Canadian legal systems.
A. Statutes and Protocolsin Canadaand the United States
Canada's bankruptcy act, amended in 1992 and now known as
the BIA, is viewed as an alternative to the CCAA.8 3 The BIA services
small and mid-sized corporate debtors who cannot meet the $5
million (CDN) threshold required by the CCAA.8 4 The CCAA, enacted
in the 1930s to allow corporate reorganizations,8 5 arguably filled gaps
in the BIA. For example, corporate liquidations had resulted from
corporate insolvencies, as the outstanding bonds of Canadian
corporations did not contain contractual provisions for allowing
amendments to the bond's terms in dire financial situations. 86 The
CCAA addressed this issue, allowing corporations to restructure their
debt.8 7 Courts resurrected the CCAA in the 1980s as an equivalent to
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 8 8 to rescue financially
troubled corporations through allowing "instant" bonds and trust
deeds to be created, interpreting § 11 of the CCAA to allow courts sole
discretion to issue stays or orders restraining secured and unsecured
creditors, and recognizing the CCAA's implied power to rescue
89
distressed companies.

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1531 (2006).
82.
See Jacob S. Ziegel, The Modernization of Canada's Bankruptcy Law in a
83.
Comparative Context, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1998); see also R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 269
(2004).

84.
R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 269; see Ziegel, supra note 83, at 9. For a detailed
description of the BIA with emphasis on sales, see David J. Griff, Working Notes on
Methods of Realization of Bankruptcy Assets, 19 CBR-ART 111 (1975). The BIA does
"not supplant the CCAA as a means of facilitating rehabilitation for large corporations.
The Emergence of Mechanisms for Cross-Border Insolvencies in
Sean Dargan,
..
Canadian Law, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 107, 113 (2001); see also R. Gordon Marantz &
Rupert H. Chartrand, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law Reform Continues: The 1996.
1997Amendments, 13 B.F.L.R. 107, 110 (1998).
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, 1932-1933 S.C., ch. 36
85.
(Can.); Dargan, supra note 84, at 111.
86.
Dargan, supra note 84, at 111.
See generally STUDY COMM. ON BANKR. &
87.
1932-1933 S.C., ch. 36.
INSOLVENCY LEGISLATION, REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY AND
INSOLVENCY LEGISLATION (1970); Dargan, supra note 84, at 111.

Dargan, supra note 84, at 111.
88.
89.
1932-1933 S.C., ch. 36; Dargan, supra note 84, at 111; see also Ziegel,,
supra note 83, at 7 (citing Elan Corp. v. Comiskey (1991), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 116-23
(Ont. CA)).

2007]

INSOL VENT CROSS-BORDER REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS

743

The U.S. Bankruptcy Code was enacted to offer a consistent
series of rules for reorganizations.9" Once a firm files a Chapter 11
petition, a corporation's "[m]anagement enjoys powerful legal tools,
including the ability to obtain additional financing by offering new
investors high priority claims, such as super-priority liens on
encumbered assets."9 1 Management also has the exclusive ability to
propose a reorganization plan during the 120 days immediately
following the Chapter 11 filing. 92 Moreover, throughout the
bankruptcy process, secured creditors may request that their
93
interests be "adequately protected."
94
Several similarities exist among the North American regimes.
For example, Canadian and U.S. creditors have voting powers under
both, and the BIA and Chapter 11 include the ability to force
modifications upon unwilling parties. 95 However, there are numerous
differences, among the insolvency statutes.96 One major distinction

90.
Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1978). The Commission was formed by
congressional act on July 24, 1970, and consisted of nine members. REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (THE COMMISSION),

H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I (1973) [hereinafter REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS],
reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1995). The
Commission began hearings in June 1971, deliberated for a total of forty-four days, and
submitted its report on July 30, 1973. Id. at pt. V. For a thorough description of the
underlying theories supporting the creation of Chapter 11 and its development, see
Clark, supra note 2, at 170.
91.
Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors' Bargain: The Entitlement to the
Going-Concern Surplus in CorporateBankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 BANKR. DEV.J.
287, 296 (2003) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006)).
92.
Id. (citing § 1121).
93.
Id. (citing §§ 361-62).
94.
The U.S. bankruptcy regime is labeled as "debtor-oriented," while the
Canadian regime is characterizes as "creditor-oriented." Janis Sarra, Debtor in
Possession Financing: The Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts to Grant Super-Priority
Financingin CCAA Applications, 23 DALHOUSIE L.J. 337, 374 (2000). 'The BIA grants
powerful rights to secured creditors at the point of bankruptcy in order to aid debt
collection and create certainty in lending decisions." Id. 'The CCAA tempers for a very
limited time period the powerful remedies of secured creditors, by taking into account
the interests of all stakeholders in the restructuring process." Id.
"The U.S.
bankruptcy scheme tempers the powerful remedies of the debtor corporation during the
prolonged period that it can remain in Chapter 11, by better balancing creditors'
interests during this period." Id. at 374-75.
95.
See Dargan, supra note 84, at 114-15 (citing Jack Friedman, What Courts
Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495, 1496
(1993)).
96.
The timeframe pertains to single-asset real estate under Chapter 11. See
Scott Carlisle, Single Asset Real Estate in Chapter 11: Secured Creditors' Perspective
and the Need for Reform, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133 (1993). Timelines vary widely
among the statutory regimes. Debtors have ninety days to submit a plan under
Chapter 11, which secured and unsecured lenders must then separately vote on.
Dargan, supra note 84, at 114. "Under the BIA, a mandatory creditors' meeting is held
within twenty-one days of a commercial reorganization plan's filing." Id. If, during
this meeting, the unsecured creditors reject the plan through a vote, the business is
deemed bankrupt. Id.
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between the BIA and the Bankruptcy Code is that the Code does not
require that the filer make a showing of insolvency for admission to
bankruptcy, which the Canadian equivalent does. 97 In Canada, "[a]
Canadian corporation is declared insolvent when its financial status
no longer allows it to pay its debts as they become due, or its
liabilities exceed its assets." 98 Only when a corporation reaches this
level, as opposed to the U.S. strategy of anticipating insolvency, it is
able to initiate BIA proceedings. 99 Additionally, unlike Chapter 11,
the CCAA mandates that "[t]he applicant bear[] the burden of
showing that there is some likelihood of success." 100 The Chapter 11
debtor may initiate an action only by "delivering a petition, a list of
names and addresses of creditors, and the filing fee to the court,"
which must be accepted by the court clerk. 10 ' Additionally, the CCAA
requires that the applicant file an application for a stay, while
Chapter 11 provides for an automatic stay. 10 2 Finally, it has been
argued that the CCAA is much more flexible than Chapter 11,
allowing Canadian judges wide discretion and latitude, 103

97.
BIA, R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 50.41 (1985) (Can.); Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§
109, 301, 302(a), 303(a) (2006); see also Theresa Beiner, et al., Take What You Can,
Give Nothing Back,: Judicial Estoppel, Employment Discrimination,Bankruptcy and
Piracy in the Courts, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 32 n.226 (2005); Nathalie Martin, Common
Law Bankruptcy System's Similarities and Differences, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV 1
(2003); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 563, 568 (1996) (describing various regimes recognizing foreign insolvency
orders); Jacob S. Ziegel, Corporate Groups and Canada.U.S. CrossborderInsolvencies:
ContrastingJudicial Visions, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 459, 462 (2001) (stating that the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code § 362 automatically imposes a stay of proceedings against the debtor
upon filing of Chapter 11 petition); Roundtable Discussion, Religious Organizations
Filingfor Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 25, 30 ("Insolvency obviously isn't a
requirement for filing for Chapter II."); Bruce Leonard & Justice J.M. Farley, Lecture,
Osgoode Hall Professional Development Centre Business Law LL.M. Program:
Insolvency Reorganization Practice and Procedure in Canada, (Feb. 10, 2004)
(hereinafter Insolvency Lecture).
98.
Dargan, supra note 84, at 114-15 (citing Daryl E. Clark, U.S. Asset-based
Lenders:Accessing the CanadianMarket, SECURED LENDER, June 1, 1999, at 38).
99.
See R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 2 (1985) (defining "insolvent person").
100.
Steven G. Golick, What, How, Where and When to File: Considerations and
Implications in Cross-border Insolvency Proceedings 6 (Feb. 24, 2003) (unpublished
paper presented at the Fourth Symposium on American/Canadian Insolvency Law, on
file with author).
101.
Chapter 11 (11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(a), 303(a) (2006)); CCAA (R.S.C., ch. B-3,
§ 269 (2004)); see also Golick, supranote 100, at 5.
102.
Chapter 11 (11 U.S.C. §§ 362 (2006)); CCAA (R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 11(1)-(6)
(2004)); see also Golick, supra note 100, at 6.
103.
The CCAA does not set forth any specific criteria as to when a stay should
be awarded, or guidelines for reviewing whether an existing stay should be either
extended or terminated. Golick, supra note 100, at 6. For example, "[nlo criteria are
set out under the CCAA for when a stay should be granted or what considerations
should be evaluated when determining whether [] a stay of proceedings should either
be terminated or extended." Id.
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particularly with respect to granting a judicial stay. 10 4 In sanctioning
a plan under the CCAA, the court balances equities, noting the
prejudices that would flow from granting or refusing the requested
relief.10 5 Similarly, noted Canadian insolvency expert Justice Blair
held that a court reviewing a CCAA matter must act reasonably,
meaning that the court must exercise "its discretion so that justice is

done to all concerned parties...

. 106

Fairness, flexibility, and

07
reasonableness are viewed as the crucial components of the CCAA.'
Despite such guidelines, however, theorists and judges also note that
08
the arguably liberal intent of the CCAA has limitations.1
Cross-border real estate developers navigating insolvency rules
in Canada and the United States will pursue various strategies, often
instituting bankruptcies in both countries. For example, cross-border
insolvencies invariably involve "either a full debtor application under
the CCAA or an ancillary proceeding pursuant to [§] 18.6 of the
CCAA (which specifically deals with international insolvencies),

104. Under CCAA § 11, a court has broad powers to stay all present and
prospective proceedings involving an insolvent business, whereby "proceedings" has
been relied on by courts to model a Chapter 11-styled approach. Golick, supra note
100. "In Meridian Developments v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, ([1984] 52 C.B.R. 109
(Q.B.)] J. Wachowich stated that the purpose of the stay power in [§]11 of the
CCAA was to maintain the status quo, to give the debtor company breathing space
to develop its restructuring plan, and to prevent creditors from trying to obtain an
advantage over other creditors." Douglas S. Nishimura, The Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act and the Petroleum Industry: The Blue Range Resource
CorporationProceedings, 39 ALBERTA. L. REV. 35, 43 (2001).
105.
Canuel, supra note 48, at 12 (citing Re Olympia & York Developments,
[1995] 34 C.B.R. (3d) 93, 500 (Can.)). Justice Blair stated that '[f]airness' and
'reasonableness' are . . . the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and
workings of [the CCAA] . . . . If a debtor company, in financial difficulties, has a
reasonable chance of staving off a liquidator by negotiating a compromise arrangement
with its creditors, 'fairness' to its creditors as a whole, and to its shareholders,
prescribes that it should be allowed an opportunity to do so, consistent with not
,unfairly' or 'unreasonably' depriving creditors of their rights under their security.
Re Olympia & York Developments, 34 C.B.R. (3d) at 508-09 (Can.).
106.
Olympia & York Developments Ltd., [1995] 38 C.B.R. (3d) 54, 62 (Can.).
107.
Canuel, supra note 48, at 6.
108.
For example, the "court may deny access to a debtor if it is demonstrated
that the debtor will not be viable once restructured." Golick, supra note 100, at 3
(citing Bargain Harold's case, Bargain Harold's Discount Ltd. v. Paribas Bank of
Canada (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 362, 370-71 (Ont. Gen. Div.), where J. Austin, in dismissing
the debtor's application, commented: "[T]he applicant still does not know the precise
nature of the problem which brought about its financial circumstances. According to
its own auditors, the cause or causes may never be known .... [T]he applicant has no
specific idea how its operation can be salvaged, other than to suggest "downsizing".
There is no reason to believe that downsizing can be done any more efficiently by the
applicant than by a receiver. . . . [There is a] complete loss of confidence in
management of the company. To this is added the failure of the applicant to suggest
who the new management might be."); see also Jacob S. Ziegel, Corporate Groups and
Canada-U.S. CrossborderInsolvencies: ContrastingVisions, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 459, 463
(2001).

746

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40..727

coupled with their respective U.S. counterparts: a full Chapter 11
case or an ancillary proceeding pursuant to [§] 304 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code." 10 9
Accordingly, real estate developers face a
number of considerations when a choice is made to file for
insolvency. 110 With respect to cross-border jurisprudential
cooperation, the BIA and the CCAA contain specific provisions
allowing Canadian courts broad powers to make orders, render relief,
and make arrangements that result in coordination with foreign
proceedings.1 1 1 Similarly, § 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, also
known as the ancillary proceeding section, allows full cooperation
with foreign proceedings. 1 12 Despite controversies, 113 most Canadian
and U.S. courts recognize foreign insolvency proceedings 114 and the

109.

Golick, supra note 100, at 1-2.

110. Insolvent companies must confront many strategic decisions when
determining exactly how to structure their claim, particularly when
considering a hybrid of filing in both Canada, the United States, or both.
These considerations should include the location of the debtor (and its
assets and creditors), whether debtor in possession financing will be
sought, protections sought by the debtor's management, and the desired
speed (and cost) of the insolvency proceedings.
Id. at 2.
111.
See CCAA, R.S.C., ch. C-36, §§ 18.6(2), 18.6(3), 18.6(6) (2004).
112.
11 U.S.C. § 304 (2006); Golick, supra note 100, at 19; see also Bruce E.
Leonard, International Insolvency Proceedings: Current International Initiatives and
the Proposed Canadian Model, inTHE CANADIAN BAR ASS'N - ONTARIO, INSOLVENCY
REFORM: THE NEXT GENERATION 36 (1996).
113.
See Singer Sewing Machine Co. of Canada, Ltd., [2000] 18 C.B.R. (4th) 127
(Can.) (refusing to recognize proceedings in New York against the Canadian subsidiary
as part of a group filing); see also In re Toga Manufacturing Limited, 28 B.R. 165
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (denying a Canadian bankruptcy trustee's request for
injunction against a U.S. creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 304, holding that it was the court's
duty to "protect United States citizens' claims against foreign judgments inconsistent
with this country's well-defined and accepted policies."); Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v.
ABC Containerline N.V., [2001] 30 C.B.R. (4th) 6, 14 (Can.) (holding that the Canadian
judicial adherence to the so-called "grab rule" "in which each national court takes
charge of assets in its own jurisdiction for the benefit of creditors who win the race to
the courthouse is to be destructive of international order and effectiveness, and that,
under the territoriality principle, the court in each jurisdiction where the debtor has
assets distributes the assets located in that jurisdiction pursuant to local rules").
114.
Recent Canadian cases generally demonstrate a willingness of courts to
order a stay of proceedings with respect to a solvent Canadian subsidiary of a debtor
that has filed for protection under Chapter 11; ordering such a stay involves
recognition of the U.S. proceedings.
See J.M. Farley, et al., Cooperation and
Coordination in Cross-Border Insolvency Cases 18-25 (Feb. 6, 2004) (unpublished
paper presented at the Univ. of British Columbia Faculty of Law: First Annual
Insolvency Review Conference, on file with author). "If the question of obtaining a stay
of proceedings against a Canadian subsidiary is an issue, a concurrent Canadian
proceeding can be commenced under the CCAA." Golick, supra note 100, at 13. In
Babcock, Justice Farley extended recognition in Ontario to a stay of proceedings order
issued in Louisiana, which was issued in response to Babcock & Wilcox (BW), Canada's
U.S. parent company and U.S. based affiliates, even though BW Canada, a Canadian
incorporated (and solvent) entity, was not party to U.S. proceedings (and not involved
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protections of assets of foreign estates, 115 particularly through the
development of protocols. These protocols are "solutions on a case-bycase basis,"116 and generally involve cases where simultaneous debtor
117
filings occur under Chapter 11 and the CCAA.
B. Legal Strategies
1.

Substantive Consolidation: Real Estate

In contending with solvent companies existing within corporate
groups, it has been argued that a corporate group should not be
divided into units, but rather treated as a singular corporate entity,
which effectively translates under the law into an "administrative
consolidation or a modified form of substantive consolidation."' 18 It
is possible for a U.S. Chapter 11 debtor's solvent affiliate to obtain a
stay under the CCAA's § 18.6 as an ancillary proceeding to the
Chapter 11 filing. 119 The "substantive consolidation" doctrine
essentially dilutes creditors' interests, as courts are permitted to
consolidate the assets of several debtor companies to create a common

in any Canadian bankruptcy proceedings). Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., [2000] 18
C.B.R. 9 (4th) 137 (Can.). U.S. courts have also demonstrated a trend of recognizing
foreign judgments. For example, in Maxwell Communication Corporation, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York and the English Court of
Appeal, based on the concept of comity, created the first cross-border insolvency
protocol. Maxwell Commc'n Corp. v. Barclays Bank (In re Maxwell Communication
Corp.), 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd,
93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)); see
also In re Drake, 1998 Bankr. Lexis 2030 (Bankr. W.D. Wa.) (issuing stay of Chapter
11 proceedings and granting a far-reaching petition under § 304 in respect of the
CCAA proceedings); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that
Bahamian law related to liquidation proceedings was in substantial conformity with
U.S. law; the U.S. judge rejected the proposition that any minor differences between
Bahamian and U.S. bankruptcy laws should favor the adoption of U.S. bankruptcy
laws).
115.
Courts seeking guidance when addressing reorganizations and developing
so-called "protocols," have reviewed the International Bar Association Concordat, the
American Law Institute's Transnational Insolvency Project, and United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)'s Model Act. For a description
of such guidance, see Farley, supra note 114, at 1-5; Anne Nielson et al., The CrossBorder Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of International
Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 534-35 (1996). See generally TRANSNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY PROJECT, PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
CASES AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (2003),

cited in Ziegel, supra note 97, at 462.
116.
Dargan, supra note 84, at 119.
117.
Id. at 120. Additionally, protocols contend with several issues, including
the coordination of hearings and procedures (such as asset sales) in multiple
jurisdictions, in addition to ensuring the equal treatment of unsecured creditors.
Farley, supra note 114, at 9.
118.
Golick, supra note 100, at 13.
119.
Id. at 14.
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fund accessible by the companies' creditors 120 in addition to
consolidating the relevant creditors (specifically for "purposes of
voting on the plan"). 12 1 Canadian courts exercise this power under
122
the broad judicial discretion allowed through the CCAA.
The CCAA's case law concerning substantive consolidation
focuses upon insolvent estates' integration and how such integration
may prejudice the estates' creditors. 123 A noted case involving
substantive consolidation is Northland Properties, 124 which suggests
that Canada utilize a two-step test for substantive consolidation
applications.
Specifically, the consolidation
proponent must
demonstrate a consolidation need, while equities must favor the
consolidation over the alternative of a separated debtor. 125
Cross-border real estate developers exhibit many of the
characteristics that Canadian courts deem necessary for a permitted
consolidation. For example, the real estate developer's subsidiaries
are often heavily intertwined within the operations of the parent. The
O&Y insolvency provides a telling example: the assets (and loan
draw-downs) of the revenues and loans for all of the twenty-nine O&Y
companies were centralized to account for all of the companies'
financial obligations (with the exception of the family's U.S. real
estate assets).126 The business affairs of real estate developers (and
their foreign subsidiaries) are heavily interrelated, based on the
presence of multiple instances of inter-corporate debt, cross default

120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id. (citing Ellen L. Hayes, Substantive Consolidation Under the Companies'
CreditorsArrangement Act and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 23 CAN. Bus. L.J.
445 (1994)); see Joy E. Mason, The Impact of Substantive Consolidationin Bankruptcy,
27 L.A. LAWYER, Sept. 2004, at 18 (noting that "the standards for invoking the remedy
of substantive consolidation have evolved through case law as opposed to legislation").
With respect to how the CCAA allows Canadian justices broad powers, see Ziegel,
supra note 83, at 6-10. One commentator implicitly questions the powers afforded
Canadian justices under the CCAA, at least in the interests of comity with respect to
enforcing U.S. judgments. See Ziegel, supra note 97, at 461-69.
123.
Golick, supra note 100, at 15 (citing Lyndon A.J. Barnes & Shelley W. Obal,
Prioritiesin Insolvency Litigation: When Judges Make The Rules, Vol. 1, No.13, FIN.
INTELLIGENCE 3, 7 (1996)).

124.
Id. (citing Northland Properties Ltd., [1988] 73 C.B.R. 146 (B.C.S.C.), affd,
[1989] 73 C.B.R. 195 (B.C.C.A.)). Northland Properties is a major western Canadian
developer that once owned nineteen hotels, several major office buildings, and prime
vacant land in Vancouver, Calgary, Oregon, and California. Canuel, supra note 48, at
22-23. At the height of its success, Northland employed over 1,000 employees and
subsequently became indebted to over 2,100 creditors. Id. In 1988, Northland claimed
insolvency, following a period of interest rates exceeding 20% and negative equity
approaching $100 million (CDN). Id.
125.
Golick, supra note 100, at 16 (citing Hayes, supra note 122, at 448). In the
United States, the Eleventh Circuit proposed a specific (and similar) substantive
consolidation test, as articulated in Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Ass'n Ltd.,
935 F. 2d 245 (lth Cir. 1991).
126.
Canuel, supra note 48, at 20.
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provisions and guarantees, and operation of centralized cash
management system. 12 7 These factors have been considered by courts
128
to be crucial in approving a consolidation.
2.

Debtor-in-Possession Financing

Under DIP financing, debtor corporations are provided an
opportunity to continue operations pending a workout, as interim
financing is granted during the stay and negotiation period. 12 9 This
financing is often granted in the real estate development proceedings,
given the vast number of employees, properties, and property
130
management costs.
Chapter 11 provides that new lenders in certain circumstances
can obtain priority over pre-filing unsecured creditors. During
restructuring, companies often need additional financing to continue
business operations. 131 Workouts are facilitated under Canadian
insolvency laws, given the rationale that insolvent corporations may

The O&Y group of companies maintained a centralized cash management
127.
system; creditors who held security on specific assets were denied the ability to
segregate revenues to ensure that such rents would not be pooled to pay the expenses
for other buildings. See Canuel, supra note 48 at 21 (citing Goldstein, supra note 53, at
162-63).
See generally PSINet Ltd., [2002] 33 C.B.R. (4th) 284, 287 (Ont. S.C.J.)
128.
(allowing four Canadian PSINet companies to file a consolidated plan on the basis that
such plan avoids complex litigation concerning the allocation of proceeds from sale of
the PSINet companies' assets to TELUS Corp).
Sarra, supra note 94, at 339. Under the CCAA, DIP financing is geared
129.
toward allowing the debtor to continue its operations while negotiations with creditors
occur. Id. at 341. The underlying policy rationale is that if the business continues to
operate, customer and supplier goodwill is preserved, while experienced employees stay
on and assist the company as it attempts to turn the corner. Id. Insolvent businesses
are often more highly valued than a going concern, which could hopefully be
restructured or sold, rather than having it dissected, with all of its assets sold to
potentially different purchasers. Id.
A few CCAA cases also refer to general, administrative, and restructuring
130.
(GAR) funding. These terms are in part interchangeable, although arguably DIP
financing is a more inclusive term because it relates to financing beyond that required
to actually restructure. GAR funding is specifically discussed in In Re Olympia & York
Developments, [19961 38 C.B.R. (3d) 309 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Re Bramalea Inc. (Mar. 1
1995), Toronto RE5055/95 (Ont. Gen. Div.). To address how general administrative
and restructuring costs would be paid, the courts decided to: (i) apply cash flow from
secured assets, such as rentals from real property and dividends from securities, to
cover the costs of managing the encumbered asset and to pay a management fee to
cover all GAR costs; (ii) approve the sale of unencumbered assets to generate further
revenues to fund GAR costs; and (iii) the Canadian court imposed a security interest on
the unencumbered assets running in favor of the secured creditors who overfunded the
GAR costs. Canuel, supra note 48, at 18.
11 U.S.C. §§ 364, 507 (2006); see also David C. Hillman & Mathew L.
131.
Caras, When the Bank Wants its Borrower in Bankruptcy: Benefits of Bankruptcy for
Lenders and Lender Liability Dependants, 40 ME L. REV. 375, 388 n.37; Golick, supra
note 100, at 24-25.
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actually be beneficial to creditors if a negotiated workout would
ultimately enhance value. 132 Canadian courts are not granted power
under legislation to grant super-priority status to loans effected after
insolvency proceedings commence. 133 Conversely, Chapter 11 grants
priority to creditors who lent during the restructuring process, with
mechanisms established to control the extension of credit. 134
However, "Section 364(b) states that if the extension [of credit] is
outside the ordinary course [of business], the priority must be
authorized by the court before the extension is made."'135 If the
reorganization fails, § 726(a) and (b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code still
provides that "post-filing debts will retain priority over unsecured
pre-filing debts in the ensuing liquidation."'1 36 "[I]f priority over prepetition unsecured claims is insufficient to induce the provision of
needed credit, sections 364(c) and (d) [of the Bankruptcy Code], allow
the court to authorize the debtor to grant security interests to post137
petition lenders, even if they prime already existing interests."'
Accordingly, "a post-filing secured lender bears minimal risk of loss,
138
even if the reorganization fails."'
Commentators have suggested that the CCAA and the BIA, as
different statutes with separate legislative objectives and schemes for
achieving those objectives, create differing methods for contending
with DIP financing. 139 For example, the BIA contends with enforcing
claims during bankruptcy and receivership, and includes provisions
for individual and commercial insolvency workouts.140
The BIA
"does not address the priorities of claims in the period of an interim
stay under either its own proposal provisions or the provisions of the

132.
Sarra, supra note 94, at 339. The courts have interpreted their equitable or
inherent jurisdiction as including the ability to order DIP financing to allow
corporations to continue operating during the stay period under the CCAA. Id. (citing
United Used Auto & Truck Parts [2000] S.C.C.A. 142.). Canadian courts have stated
that they will not be bound to certain DIP tests prevalent in the United States, such as
the requirement to provide adequate protection.
133.
Golick, supra note 100, at 25 (emphasis added). Disputes have arisen
regarding the scope and process of granting DIP financing during the workout period,
given the dearth of legislative direction concerning the issues of priority and such DIP
financing. Sarra, supra note 94, at 352. Under Canadian case law, "five principles
currently operat[e] in the courts' consideration of applications for DIP financing:
adequate notice, sufficient disclosure, timeliness of the request, balancing the
prejudice, and the principle of granting priority financing as an extraordinary remedy."
Id. at 375
134.
Golick, supra note 100, at 25. For example, "[§] 364(a) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code [provides] that if the extension of credit is in the ordinary course of
business, the priority is automatic." Id.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 364 (c)-(d) (2006).
138.
Golick, supra note 100, at 25.
139.
Sarra, supra note 94, at 340.
140.

Id.
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CCAA."' 14 1 Commentators point out that as the Canadian Parliament
intended the CCAA and BIA as complementary statutes, courts
should not be viewed as having "compromised the rights of senior
creditors by the granting of proportionately small priority financing
to facilitate the aims of the CCAA."' 142 The CCAA focuses upon
allowing the corporation to continue under a credible business plan
and generate income, whereby creditors and the public generally may
Commentators questioned
receive greater potential value. 143
whether a court reviewing a CCAA filing has the appropriate
jurisdiction "to order priority payment and DIP financing without the
debtor obtaining the consent of creditors, in order to facilitate the
restructuring objectives of the CCAA, given the creditors' priorities
144
enshrined in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act."'
In either scenario, DIP financing seeks to create new funding
potential.
At the point of insolvency, credit is a much riskier proposition than
when a corporation is solvent, and thus lenders of DIP financing are
able to extract a premium i.e., priority financing in exchange for
advancing the money . . . . [W]here all of the corporation's assets are

already subject to secured creditors' claims, such new private financing
145
will not be available.

Critics argue that when the court orders DIP financing, one major
concern is why additional risk should be assumed by existing secured
creditors when they do not have a veto, or even a vote, as to acquiring
146
such additional risk.
Reasonable fees of the court-appointed monitor in the CCAA
application raise another type of priority charge. Generally, this
includes the legal and professional fees of the monitor. 147 A
Canadian court following the CCAA appoints a monitor, whose role
148
resembles that of a trustee under the BIA's proposal provisions.
The monitor is crucial in the context of a real estate developer's
insolvency, as the monitor may act as an intermediary with creditors
(including facilitating negotiations) and provide expertise as to

141.
Id.
142.
Id. Advocates challenge the contention that creditors are prejudiced by the
monitor's administration charges and DIP financing, noting that the CCAA's objectives
"are to facilitate a workout" and protect creditors (including consumers, employees, and
landlords. Id.
143.

Id.

144.
145.
146.

Id. at 339.
Id. at 342.
Id. (emphasis added).

147.

Id.

148.
Id. The courts also grant DIP financing under BIA proposal provisions.
Courts have determined that they have jurisdiction to order administration charges to
facilitate the objectives of the CCAA, specifically a monitor's legal and professional fees
to carry out its statutory duties and to assist in the negotiation of a plan of
arrangement or compromise. Id. at 343.
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whether the revised business plan's requirements can be followed by
149
the debtor corporation.
Case law reiterates that Canadian courts maintain authority to
provide court officers (including a receiver) with super-priority to
protect property under their control, in addition to protecting the fees
of court appointed receivers and their counsel. 150 One commentator
found that the court rendered the "most extreme example" of superpriority DIP financing orders in the celebrated Algoma case. 151 The
commentator noted that there was no evidence in Algoma that the
noteholders had adequate protection and that the noteholders were,
in fact, undersecured. 152 The court nevertheless approved the
requested priming charge without notice to the noteholders. 153
Accordingly, the Algoma court's decision runs against the DIP
financing provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 364 under which, among
other things, the debtor must demonstrate its inability to obtain nonpriming financing. 154 The process of DIP financing becomes less
arduous depending on several factors, including the availability of
unencumbered assets with which to satisfy existing secured creditors,
funds, or both. 155 In such instances, the debtor effectively borrows
money "on the strength of new security granted, with no attempt to
156
shift priorities."'
3.

Extending the Stay of Proceedings

As real estate developers face insolvency, courts weigh the
implication of their financial distress, particularly in the context of
leasing. Courts will carefully consider the extension of a stay of
bankruptcy proceedings, noting the implications to tenants. The
CCAA's extended stay of proceedings are under Chapter 11.
Canadian courts, acting under their inherent jurisdiction, can stay
persons from proceeding against non-parties to the reorganization
filing. 1 5 7
One specific example involves Eaton's, a now defunct
Canadian department store chain which acted as an anchor tenant in
several Canadian shopping malls. The majority of these shopping
mall tenants had leases which provided that the tenants could

149.

Id. at 342 (citing R. Gordon Marantz, The Reorganization of a Complex

Corporate Entity: The Bramalea Story, in CASE STUDIES IN RECENT CANADIAN
INSOLVENCY REORGANIZATIONS, supra note 53, at 1, 16).

150.
Golick, supra note 100, at 25-26.
151.
Id. at 31 (discussing Re Algoma Steel Inc., [2001] 25 C.B.R. 4th 194 (Can.)).
152.
Golick, supra note 100, at 31.
153.
Id.
154.
Id. at 32-33. For an interesting discussion as to when DIP financing leads
to unpredictable (or unforeseen) results, see Kaplan, supra note 64, at 1120-26.
155.
Golick, supra note 100, at 33.
156.
Id.
157.
Id. at 8.
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renegotiate their leases or abandon their leashold estate should the
anchor tenant "go dark."' 1 58 Following Eaton's bankruptcy filing
under the CCAA, an order was requested under which shopping
center tenants would be stayed from exercising their leasehold rights
159
to go dark (subsequent to the closure of an Eaton's anchor store).
Landlords believed the court order would bring stability and prevent
disruption at the shopping malls. 160 The court, considering the needs
161
of the various landlords, approved the stay.
4.

"Executory" Real Estate Contracts-Termination of Interests

Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code contends with the
termination or affirmation of executory contracts. 162 One of the
principal purposes of a bankruptcy proceeding is to maximize the
cash available for distribution to general unsecured creditors of the
debtor; if the debtor owns real estate and the real estate is
encumbered by restrictive covenants or executory interests such as
reversions, the amount of cash a trustee realizes from a sale of real

158.
Id. at 9. See generally Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Going Dark Aggressively,
http://dirt.umkc.edulfiles/dark.htm (last visited May 20, 2007) (discussing the concept
of "going dark").
159.
Golick, supra note 100, at 9.
160.
Id. (citing Re T. Eaton Co. Ltd. RE7483/97, [1997] O.J. 6388 QUICKLAW
(O.C.J. May 8, 1997) (Can.)).
161.
The stay gave "landlords sufficient time to replace Eaton's with another
anchor tenant in those centres where Eaton's had disclaimed its lease obligations,
without having to worry about tenants fleeing the premises." Golick, supra note 100,
at 10.
162.
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006). The term "executory contract" is not defined in the
Bankruptcy Code, although it has been proposed that an executory contract is "a
contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the
contract are so far underperformed that the failure of either to complete performance
would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Gregory
Hesse, Impact of Bankruptcy on Deed Restrictions and Executory Interests, 14 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (1995) (quoting Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)). Other theorists propose that "a
contract that has been fully performed on either side is not executory." Madlyn Gleich
Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot Com Bankruptcies: Assumption,
Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts Including Intellectual Property
Agreements and Related Issues Under Sections 365(c), 365(e) and 365(n) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 310 (2000) (citing 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 365.02[1] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 2000)). 'Some courts have held
that a contract must be substantially unperformed on both sides to be executory."
Primoff & Weinberger, supra, at 310 (citing In re C & S Grain Co., 47 F.3d 233, 237
(7th Cir. 1995); In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 247 B.R. 51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1999); In re Street & Beard Farm Partnership, 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989)). "In
determining whether an agreement is an executory contract, courts will typically
examine the unperformed duties and obligations of each party." Primoff & Weinberger,
supra, at 310 (citing In re Qintex Entertainment, Inc., 950 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir.
1991)).
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estate may be reduced. 1 63
Under Chapter 11, the trustee could
realize a higher cash value from the sale of the real estate if it could
reject the restrictive deed covenants 164 or executory interests
pursuant to 11 USC § 365,165 or sell the property free and clear of the
restrictive deed covenants or executory interests pursuant to 11 USC
§ 363.
Extensive scholarship also has been devoted to the
classification (and termination) of leases as "executory contracts"
66
under the Code.'
Real estate developers, seeking to control and protect the
longevity of certain development rights, have rediscovered tools such
as Reciprocal Easement Agreements (REAs). 16 7 It has been proposed

163.
Hesse, supranote 162, at 20.
164.
It has been proposed that courts have concluded that a "restrictive
covenant is an interest in property that cannot be rejected" and that "trustees will be
unable to enhance the value of property by rejecting restrictive covenants or executory
interests that impair the marketability of the property, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365."
Id. at 26.
165.
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 365 provides that the
trustee has the authority to assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease.
The purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) is to enable a trustee in bankruptcy to reject an
executory contract or unexpired lease that does not provide an appropriate economic
benefit to the debtor or imposes a burdensome liabilities on the debtor. Hesse, supra
note 162, at 20.
166.
For a discussion of acceptance and rejection of leases by a bankruptcy
trustee (including the obligations a debtor must undertake), see Bruce H. White,
Wiliam L. Medford & John C Murray, Practice & Procedure: Recharacterization of
Synthetic Leases: How a Lease Becomes a Secured Claim, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20
(1999). The authors propose that a synthetic lease, which allows a lessee/corporate real
estate user to book real estate payments as landlord expenses without identifying these
expenses as balance sheet debts runs the risk of being characterized as an unsecured
claim in a bankruptcy. Id. Courts closely examine synthetic leasing transactions to
determine whether a lease is actually a financing transaction and if a lessee is actually
a beneficial owner, following § 502(b)(6) of the Code. Id. at 21. Courts review a variety
of factors, including whether: (i) rental payments actually were used as investment
returns rather than compensation for the tenants' use of the leasehold estate, (ii) the
purchase price was related to fair market value of the property or was actually
intended to finance the deal, (iii) tax advantages shaped how the transaction was
structured, and (iv) whether the lessee assumed obligations tied to the financing. Id.
Accordingly, to assist in preventing recharacterization as a security agreement,
synthetic lease documents "should include typical mortgage provisions to protect the
synthetic lessor's interests." Id.
167.
An REA is "an agreement that applies to multiple parcels of land that are
generally part of a single, joint development project or development scheme." George
W. Further Misinterpretationof Bankruptcy Code Section 363(D: Elevating In Rem
Interests and Promoting the Use of Property Law to Bankruptcy-Proof Real Estate
Developments, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289, 315 (2002). An REA "is recorded in state or
county real estate records along with deeds and other grants and conveyances of
record." Id. (citing Marvin Garfinkel, May All or Portions of a Recorded Shopping
Center Reciprocal Easement Agreement Be Rejected as an Executory Contract Under
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 83, 94 (1983)).
"Reciprocal easement agreements commonly contain affirmative and restrictive
covenants and negative and affirmative easements including cross-easement
arrangements; easements to construct, use, or maintain improvements on another
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that characterizing certain real estate property rights to create a
present in rem property interest that runs with the land, such as
REAs, residential community covenants, codes, and restrictions and
conservation or environmental easements, will insulate those rights
from certain sections of the Code.16 8 One commentator proposes that
REAs will insulate real estate development projects from bankruptcy
risk, as partnership agreements and "traditional" contractual
methods will likely be construed as executory contracts and, in the
buyer's subsequent bankruptcy case, these contracts will be subject to
rejection under § 365, the result of which would leave the seller with
a pre-petition claim of unknown security. 169 "A non-severable
REA ...will not be stripped off the property absent consent or a bona
'170
fide dispute in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.
The 1992 amendments to the BIA created provisions which
effected the termination of executory contracts, as the amendments
provided that a debtor making a proposal could terminate certain
commercial real estate leases if the debtor demonstrated that the
lease termination was essential to the proposal's success. 171
Disclaiming contracts with executory provisions to be undertaken by
the debtor are not addressed under the BIA, and the CCAA does not
include any provisions regarding executory contracts. 172 Courts,
following the broad inherent jurisdiction under the CCAA, have made
"orders allowing debtors to terminate and breach contracts, which
then forces the non-defaulting party to claim as an unsecured creditor
for its damages in the CCAA proceedings.' 73 Courts may terminate
leases and thereby alter landlord rights, similar to sanctioning CCAA
174
plans which alter secured creditors rights.

parcel; [and] easements pertaining to improvements on the parcel itself such as lateral
support, encroachment, party wall, and access arrangements ...." Kuney, supra, at
315-16 (citing Garfinkel, supra, at 95-99). "Individual lease and operating agreements
and the rights of mortgagees may be respectively subordinated to the rights conferred
in an REA." Kuney, supra, at 317 (citing Denise L. Savage, Reciprocal Easement
Agreements: Assumption and Rejection in Bankruptcy, 19 REAL EST. L.J. 99, 100 n.4
(1990)).

168.
Section 363(f)(1) or Section 363(0(5) of the Code should permit a sale free
and clear of all encumbrances. Kuney, supra note 167, at 312.
169.
Id. at 313-14.
170.
Id. at 314-15. The REA will continue to encumber the real property
despite bankruptcy proceedings. See id.
171.
R.S.C., ch. 27, § 2 (1992); Golick, supranote 100, at 37.
172.
Golick, supra note 100, at 37.
173.
Id. (citing Re Blue Range Resources Corp., [2000] 20 C.B.R. (4th) 187
(Can.)).

174.
Golick, supra note 100, at 38 (citing Re Armbro Enterprises Inc., [1993] 22
C.B.R. (2d) 80 (Can.)).
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Cram Down Provisions

Following the satisfaction of certain requirements, 1 75 a debtor is
allowed under Chapter 11 to impose a plan of organization on
opposing impaired creditors. 176 With respect to extinguishing of real
177
property interests through a cramdown, there is no direct case law.
Commentators note that U.S. courts have allowed substantial
modification of lien-holders' rights through cramdown. 178 In the
United States, courts may confirm plans that allow debtors to
extinguish due-on-sale clauses; modify notes to include a thirty-day
cure period for monetary defaults; and limit or eliminate
nonmonetary defaults unrelated to collateral to eliminate
prepayment penalties, default interest, late payment charges, and
reporting requirements. 179 A cramdown requires providing either the
present value of a claim or less than that value (with no junior class
distributions) to interest holders.' 8 0 Coupled with § 1141(c) of the

175.
These requirements include: (i) confirmation of all standards under §
1129(a) and (ii) the plan's "fair and equitable treatment" of the impaired classes
(holding both secured and unsecured claims). See J. Robert Stoll & Amy S. Korte,
Cross-BorderInsolvency ProceedingsInvolving Assets Located in the United States of
America, 20 NAT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 53, 19 (2003).
176.
Golick, supra note 100, at 49. "Cramdown" is defined by one commentator
as a means to obtain approval of plans over the objections of dissenting creditors,"
which "requires the court to engage in costly and time-consuming valuation
proceedings before approving a plan." Sarra, supra note 94, at 373. "Under the cram
down rule, shareholders as the most junior claimants, do not receive any value in the
reorganized corporation unless creditors consent or all claims are paid in full." Id.; see
also Kuney, supra note 167, at 322 n.154 ("Cramdown is the colloquial expression for
confirming a plan that has not been accepted by all classes of creditors as required for
consensual confirmation under § 1129(a) [of the Code]. A nonexclusive list of the
standards for cramdown is found in § 1129(b).").
177.
See Kuney, supra note 167, at 322.
178.
See id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id. at 325. Further:
Cram down under alternative (i)-by providing the holder of an in rem interest
with the present value of that interest-is simply a matter of providing just
compensation for what may be viewed as the government's taking of that
interest through the bankruptcy reorganization process, a public use. But
cramdown under alternative (ii)-payment of less than the full present value of
the claim and providing no distribution to junior classes-runs smack into the
Constitutional prohibition on takings without just compensation. If cram down
is to be accomplished by giving the holder of an in rem interest less than the
present value of that interest, a taking without just compensation is what is
being proposed, and the fact that junior classes of interest holders receive
nothing under the absolute priority rule is no salve for this uncompensated
injury. There are two alternatives in such a circumstance: either confirmation
must be denied by the bankruptcy court upon objection by the interest holder,
or the interest holder may proceed in the appropriate court with a 'takings'
claim against the United States.
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Code, which provides for post-confirmation vesting of property
pursuant to the plan free and clear of "all claims and interests of
creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the
debtor,"'18 1 cramdown may provide an avenue for stripping off in rem
interests in a Chapter 11 case.
82
A cramdown is unavailable under the CCAA or the BIA.1
Theorists assert that the application of U.S. law undermines
contingent claimants from influencing the plan. 183 Under the CCAA,
"a secured creditor can effectively be crammed down only if it is
included in a class of creditors where it does not have a veto, that
class approves the plan despite the creditor's negative vote and the
court sanctions the plan at the hearing required to approve the plan
following its acceptance by the required majority of creditors.' 1 84 In
the Canadian real estate development context, cramdown issues arise
in the context of creditors holding specific mortgages against various
properties owned by different companies that were placed in one
85
class.
Several other concepts, formalized under the U.S. statutory
insolvency regime, are at least implicitly recognized through
Canadian case law (despite the absence of any corresponding statute).
Equitable subordination, 186 for example, has been accepted by
Canadian courts.' 8 7 Additionally, unlike the U.S. bankruptcy laws,
the CCAA contains no statutory prohibition against using cash

181.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2006).
182.
Pamela L.J. Huff & Lisa S. Corne, Recent Developments in Cross-Border
Insolvencies: Application of the Proper Law in the Sale of Assets and the Claims
Process, 2000 C.N.I.R. LEXIS 19, 28 (2000).
183.
Id.
184.
Jeffrey B. Gollob & Lisa Kerbel Caplan, Overview of Insolvency Proceedings
in Canada, 2000 C.C.I.R. LEXIS 4, 21 (2000); see Jacob S. Ziegel & Rajvinder S. Sahni,
An Empirical Investigation of Corporate Division 1 Proposals in the Toronto
Bankruptcy Region (c), 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 665, 680 (2003) (stating that under the
CCAA, Canadian courts may give "debtors much flexibility in structuring classes of
creditors for voting purposes to enable a debtor to forge an alliance of favourable
votes"). One commentator notes that some courts have taken a "relaxed approach to
evaluating the classifications of secured claims in an attempt to give the debtor a
means of binding a disruptive secured creditor to a fair and equitable plan that will
allow for the survival of the debtor company." Golick, supra note 100, at 50.
185.
Northland Properties Ltd., [1988] 73 C.B.R. 146 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd, [1989] 73
C.B.R. 195 (B.C.C.A.).
186.
Equitable subordination "permits a court exercising equitable jurisdiction
to postpone 'the otherwise valid claims of one creditor to those of other creditors where
that creditor has engaged in some kind of inequitable conduct that has secured for it an
unfair advantage or that has resulted in injury either to the other creditors or to the
debtor."' Golick, supra note 100, at 52-53 (quoting Lyndon A.J. Barnes & Shelley W.
Obal, Priorities in Insolvency Litigation: When Judges Make The Rules, 13 FIN.
INTELLIGENCE 3, 8 (1996)).

187.
Id. (citing Canadian Deposit Insurance Corp v. Canadian Commercial Bank
[1992] 16 C.B.R. (3d) 154, 190-93 (Can.)).
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collateral to assist in funding the restructuring process. 188 As
commentators continue to explore and review the concept of crossestate developers, new
border insolvencies in the context of real
18 9
issues will emerge for study and comment.

IV.

REVIEWING OPTIONS: CLIMBING OUT OF THE WELL

Despite the issues that overlap in both the U.S. and Canadian
portions of a cross-border insolvency and the apparent trend to
promote judicial cooperation in proceedings spanning both countries,
bankruptcy must be viewed as the last resort to real estate
Even once cross-border bankruptcy proceedings
developers.
commence, the stated policy goal (and hopeful goal of all parties to
the insolvency) is to salvage a viable business, ensuring continued
employment, payment of contracts, and honoring the financial
obligations due lenders. To best avoid bankruptcies in the real estate
development context, the following actions should be taken: (i)
pursuing the smart diversification of real estate investments; (ii)
supporting a strong, centralized manager willing to entertain
competent investment advice (and recognizing when the manager has
become a liability, rather than an asset); (iii) ensuring that financial

Golick, supra note 100, at 47.
188.
For example, real estate mortgage investment conduit trusts (REMICs) are
189.
now involved in advanced bankruptcy law analysis. See C. Wade Cooper, Commercial
Real Estate Securitization: A New Generation of Secured Creditors?, 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 20 (1994). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 produced REMICs, given that the Act
allows single-level taxation for a qualifying entities that hold a fixed mortgage pool,
including owner's trust or fixed investment trust corporations. Id. at 23 (citing
KENNETH G. LORE, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN
THE SECONDARY MARKET 6-3 (1994)). "[I]nvestors receive an undivided interest in the
underlying mortgage loans, a status similar in nature to a loan participant." Cooper,
supra, at 28. In a structured, multi-class REMIC, different classes may elect to
participate in loan treatment negotiations or also appear before the court, which
presents the opportunity for conflicting interests among various class members. Id. at
30. Different classes at various ends of the priority structure may view loan treatment
negotiations very differently. Id. at 31. Additionally, conflict within the same class is
possible. See id. Despite potential issues, commentators urge relying less on bank
debt to finance construction, and more on equity. Wall Street's scrutiny of real estate
investment trusts, in particular, have purportedly decreased speculative development
while increasing the disbursement of timely, appropriate information to investors. Hot
Property, supra note 23. The expansion of real estate investment trusts is wellestablished: between 1992 and 2004, the U.S. real estate investment trust (REIT)
industry grew from $6 billion to $310 billion, driven by commercial real estate lenders
exiting the market. Reits are an American Dream That May Come True in Europe,
EUROPROPERTY, July 1, 2004, at 23. This boom also reflects the recognized need for
strong, professional management. Id. For a comprehensive discussion tracing the
history of REITs, in addition to the tax and fiduciary implications of such entities, see
Chadwick M. Cornell, REITS and UREITS: Pushing the CorporateLaw Envelope, 145
U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (1997).
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information indicating troubled investments is adequately reviewed;
and (iv) encouraging lenders to lend in a measured, far-sighted
fashion, without being swept up in the fervor of an "upswing" market.
Real estate developers should attempt to create a methodical,
smart investment approach, rather than advocate an aggressive
market focus oblivious to impending market shifts, resulting in
overbuilding and fueling a declining economic atmosphere. 190 With
respect to targeting and maintaining investment resources, a
developer's mix of its real estate portfolio must be logical and
diversified. 19 1 During the real property busts discussed in Part II,
infra, new and unfamiliar businesses were acquired, and Canadian
companies "committed to new geographic markets 'without adequate
reconnaissance and market analysis. 1 92 Many companies during the
downturn of the 1980s realized that spreading risk to investors
through broad diversification and routinely approving contractual
obligations to honor guarantees to investors forced these developers
193
into bankruptcy.
In reacting to a forecast of the real estate market of 1990-2000, a
Canadian theorist proposed that there would be tensions in the
Canadian market, which demanded resolute, effective property
mangers to contend with the following competing factors: (i) an
increased demand by purchasers, such as life insurance companies
and pension funds; (ii) a decreased demand by users such as tenants;
and (iii) downward pressure on real estate returns. 194 The manager
must manage the portfolio with the "prudent man rule," managing
the portfolio as if the manager were the owner. 195 The successful
manager must thus have a micro approach (in which he is aware of
the ongoing performance of individual properties in a portfolio while
recognizing the role of the property manager) 196 and a macro
approach (in which he makes decisions of selling/maintaining

190.
Developers often only address short-term market concerns and fail to
recognize real estate inflation (and its impacts). WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 14-15.
Overbuilding can create devaluation and financial upheaval, which stymies urban
development and results in the negative consequences of commercial real estate
inactivity, including unemployment. Id.
191.
The 1982 Canadian real estate crash demonstrated that geographic
diversification of development projects does not necessarily produce stability. Id. at
139.
192.
Id. at 138.
193.
Id. at 140.
194.
Stephen B. Demmings, Roles and Responsibilities of the Asset Manager in
the 1990s, in MANAGING REAL ESTATE ASSETS FOR PROFITABILITY AND GROWTH 4

(1989). The Vancouver market has surged again, with an estimated $62 billion in real
estate projects lined up through 2015. Derrick Penner, Building Boom Shows No Signs
of Leveling Off, VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 27, 2005, at C3.
195.
Demmings, supra note 194, at 5.
196.
Micro considerations include analyzing and comparing property
performance on a regular basis and forecasting performance on properties. Id. at 8.
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individual properties in their relationship to an entire portfolio). 19 7
198
The manager should frequently monitor the property portfolio,
while developing an acceptable baseline for a portfolio's life held
under a particular investor's ownership (the so-called life cycle). 1 99
Finally, the manager should not be swept away in the excitement to
develop as quickly as possible and capitalize on an up market without
seriously weighing all consequences. 20 0 The ultimate decisionmaker
must hold managers accountable for their strategic decisions, while
recognizing strong, independent leaders from thoughtless risk20 1
takers.
Lack of up-to-date, accurate financial information (or failure to
actually study such information) are symptoms of impending
problems. Such information reveals that the company is maintaining
a steady cash flow. 20 2 Undercapitalization and a history of continued
losses also indicate troubled businesses. For example, Canadian
company Algoma Steel's 1991 insolvency was attributed in part to an
enormous long-term debt load, estimated at $700 million in 1991.203
Rising out of insolvency, the company became insolvent once again
20 4
during 2001, having accumulated debt greater than $560 million.

197.
Id. at 6. The macro portfolio skills of the manager require "defined real
estate investment strategies for desired portfolio mix." Id. The "idealized" asset
manger of the twenty-first century must be cognizant of various macro considerations,
with an ability to: (i) conduct regular external appraisal reviews; (ii) present "value
enhancement opportunities" (e.g., re-tenanting, rehabilitation, refinancing, or
remerchandising); and (iii) be aware of alternative investment options (e.g., stocks,
bonds, and money markets). Id. at 6-7.
198.
Property management monitoring should include the monthly assessment
of various indicators, including expense variances, arrears assessment, and analysis
and vacancy statistics. Id. at 8.
199.
The concept of a property's life cycle (meaning the period in a property's life
that is held under a particular investor's ownership, and not its physical life) has been
reviewed. Id. at 14. During the 1980s, a property's holding period ranged between
three and ten years; the advent of investors from the Pacific Rim (particularly in
Vancouver and Toronto), who are usually willing to hold onto properties for generations
to secure returns, greatly elongated the life cycle. Id.
200.
Examples of reducing risk in land development projects include purchasing
"reasonably-priced" land, minimizing overhead and administration costs, focusing on
"diversified urban centers," and resisting the temptation to become over-extended.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 206-07.
201.
Bad management exists where managers do not effectively combine
industry knowledge, entrepreneurial intuition, and technical management skills.
Wilson, supra note 8, at 26. The factors indicating a tip-off to bad managers include
"high turnover rates among employees," "inadequate financial planning and controls,"
"mismatch between managerial skills and the economic age of [the] business," and a
"gut feeling' about the managers of a business. Id. at 26-27.
202.
Id.
203.
JANIS
SARRA,
CREDITOR
RIGHTS
AND
RESTRUCTURING INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS 158 (2003).

THE

PUBLIC

INTEREST:

204.
Id. at 164. Experts warn that successful commercial real estate lenders
"never completely take [their eyes] off the loan recovery." James R. Stillman, Loan
Recovery: The Real Estate Secured Lender's Assessment of Value, Commercial Real
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One recent commentator warns that today's market also bears
similarities to the bubble of the 1980s, including the arrival of real
estate speculators, the "gold rush frenzy to avoid missing the
market," and the seeming belief that real estate investments are
''
"invulnerable" and may "resist cyclical [market] fluctuations. 205
Lenders seem to have learned their lessons, diversifying
portfolios and curtailing open-ended loans. 20 6 To combat a downturn,
measured, sensible lending policies must be maintained. 20 7 Financial
institutions, extending loans in a carefully controlled manner with
sensible debt ratios and well thought out underwriting (and loan
documents) will hopefully avoid many of the traps confronted during
the previous real estate development busts. 208 "Liberal lending
policies and 'no-strings-attached' corporate loans were at the root of
previous financial crises. ' 20 9 Real estate development companies

Estate Defaults, Workouts, and Reorganizations, ABA SPRING 2002 SYMPosIA, Apr. 25,
2002, at 2, available at http:lwww.abanet.org/rppt/meetings-clel2002/2002spring/
RealProperty/Thursday/JerkingTheLenderAround/Stillman.pdf.
The lender should
carefully consider resale factors such as real property impairments and transaction
costs associated with resale in addition to the contested foreclosure adjustment, which
relates to costs and uncertainties associated with seizing the property from the
borrower, including litigation expenses. See id.
205.
Sandler, supra note 18, at 6.
206.
Some developers survived the crashes, through financial restructuring and
loan modifications. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 156. The result was that banks and
other financial institutions had to bear the financial burden of insolvent firms. The
availability of credit and its role refueled the property boom. It has been theorized that
many factors, including inexperience, questionable judgment, greed, and losing
optimistic returns to competitors, motivated lenders to loan money carelessly to certain
real estate developers. Id. at 156-57. Bankers during the boom/bust years "became
wound up in a never-ending cycle of inflation" and "were competing with each other."
Id. at 157. In addition, some real estate lenders did not have substantial commercial
real estate experience or topical knowledge. Id. at 158. Experts were overworked, and
many developers dealt with local developers who were, in the view of one theorist,
gullible and not specialized. Id.
207.
The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in 1990, 2.94%, rose to
3.02% the next year. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Why Banks Can Avoid a Hard Landing, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000, at BU6. Savings and loans institutions had a non-performance
ratio of 3.96% in 1991. Id.
208.
One popular method of raising funds which could be used rather liberally
by real estate developer borrowers was through debentures. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2,
at 152. Lenders did not attempt to follow how the funds were spent. With such
seeming disinterest and lack of scrutiny, such sums could (and did) end up as equity in
real estate acquisitions. As debentures provided the initial equity, developers could
stack loans until the existing credit became exhausted. See id.
209.
Id. at 154-55. In the boom years, property was largely financed with debt;
borrowers had an incentive to exploit their creditors by increasing the riskiness of their
projects. Hot Property, supra note 23, at 86. When conditions soured, the lenders
would bear most losses, and thus the developers did not have the incentive to invest
their own funds and stabilize the darkening situation. Id.
Additionally, bank
employees sought to reap financial rewards by maximizing the number of approved
loans, with the employees expecting to leave their positions when the loans defaulted.
Banks moved slowly hoping that either a government would bail them out or that the
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often are short-sighted, selling more valuable real estate inventory at
year-end simply to meet stock market expectations, despite the fact
that holding the inventory longer would possibly reap greater
profit. 210 Uncontrollable debt service ratios must be reigned in, and
generous extensions of credit must be forestalled. For example, some
development companies in the early 1980s increased their credit and
cash lines "to shore up the cash flow from operations" as companies
sensed a weakening economy. 211 As the anticipated recovery did not
occur, developers evaporated their assets while the recession
continued and worsened. 212 The close and careful scrutiny of
developers by wary financiers should occur, and the real value of the
213
firm must be recognized.
Although it has been suggested that "capitalism without
bankruptcy is like Christianity without hell," 214 few real estate
developers or their creditors willingly seek to endure the flames of a
bankruptcy's inferno or the resulting implications.
While the
bankruptcy of real estate developers must continue to be discouraged
(particularly considering the disastrous implications stemming from
the real estate downturns of the late twentieth century), practitioners
and legal theorists must recognize the practical realties that a crossborder real estate developer file bankruptcy and live without the
215
resulting benefits and burdens.

market would improve. Id. Conversely, as of 2001, pension funds and real estate
investment trusts owned roughly 75% of institutional, quality commercial real estate
nationally; these institutional owners have a reputation for measured growth and
investment. Johnson, supra note 7, at 68.
210.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 146. Based upon the Author's experience as a
practitioner, carefully crafted loan documents with negative covenants could control
asset sales.
211.
Id. at 155.
212.
Id. For example, "a test for the issuance of a bond has to be the assurance
that a company has the ability to maintain an income stream over the life of the bond.
Bankers should also pay more attention to the markets, the industry's nature, to
project feasibility, and to their impact on both the company and the bank." Id. In
short, "corporate decision makers must focus on the organization's survival rather than
on individual projects or grand strategies." Id.
213.
Real estate investors have moved beyond sophisticated, large-scale REITs,
insurance companies, and pension funds. It has been asserted that the "new real
estate speculator" (derided as either a do-it-yourself investor garnering its knowledge
from "Dummies books on building a real estate empire" or individuals sucked into the
"gold rush mentality") arguably influences the current real estate bubble. Sandler,
supra note 18, at 4.
214.
Quotes of the Day, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 1996, at 2.
215.
A "successful" asset liquidation must necessarily involve a tactical
approach by all involved parties, such that each party acts: (i) "based on an expert
understanding of [the] ultimate legal and business consequences"; (ii) to "protect[ ] or
improve[ ] the asset value of the loan recovery or, from the borrower's point of view,
moves the equity valuation in the positive direction"; (iii) to "minimize[ ] transaction
costs . . . [that] are not cost-effective"; and (iv) to "promot[e] finality of result."
Stillman, supra note 204, at 11.

